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re-argument denied, 857 N.E.2d 68 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1332 (2007)
Property formerly owned by IBM and used by it to train its own employees and rented to others for similar use was sold to the Legion of Christ, a recognized order of the Roman Catholic Church, which used the property for conference, training, education purposes. Before the Legion purchased the property, the Town warned the Legion that it would not be permitted to use the property for a “seminary,” as the zoning allowed use of the parcel for “conference and training facilities.” Soon after the purchase the Town commenced an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the use of the property as a college or seminary was not permitted without a special use permit. The case proceeded through extensive motion practice, an interlocutory appeal, trial, and subsequent appeals.
The Court of Appeals considered whether the Legion’s use of the parcel was permissible pursuant to the Town Code. The Court held that the use was permissible pursuant to existing zoning and stated that “the Town Code definition might almost have been written to describe what the Legion does on the property – and this is unsurprising, for it was written to describe what IBM did there, and the Legion does much of the same thing.” The Court noted the one difference between IBM and the Legion that was important to the Town – the fact that Legion was tax exempt – but stated that “keeping property in taxpaying hands is not a legitimate purpose of zoning.” The Court further rejected the Town’s argument that because the duration of the Legion’s programs of study are longer than those offered by IBM, its use would be better described as a college or seminary, finding that the Legion used the parcel as a conference and training center and whether it could also be called a college or seminary was irrelevant. Following the decision, the Town sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, which that Court denied.
Legion of Christ, Inc. v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 N.Y.3d 406, 806 N.E.2d 973 (2004)
The Legion of Christ, a recognized order of the Roman Catholic Church, applied for tax exempt status in connection with its 168-acre parcel of unimproved land pursuant to New York Real Property Tax Law, which allows non-profit organizations to receive tax exemption for unimproved land when use of the land and construction of improvements is in good faith contemplated by the organization. After its application for tax exempt status was denied by the Town Assessor and its corresponding complaint was denied by the Board of Assessment Review based on the assertion that the subject parcel was unimproved and approvals legally required to make use of the property, including the obtainment of building permits or special permits, had not yet been obtained or even applied for, the Legion commenced a tax certiorari proceeding seeking to annul the denial of the exemption.
The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court, which determined that the subject property was fully taxable for the years at issue and lifted the stay of enforcement of the tax liens placed on the property. The Appellate Division reasoned that while the Legion’s intended principal use of the property was for religious institutional purposes, its proposed use of the property was illegal absent a special use permit and such illegal use barred tax exemption. The Court of Appeals rejected the proposition that a special use permit was required as a condition precedent to a real property exemption pursuant to Real Property Tax Law. The Court held that the proper inquiry was whether the development of the property for tax exempt purposes was “in good faith contemplated,” and while an application for a special use permit may well be a factor in determining good faith, the inquiry necessarily is fact specific.
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975)
The owners of property approximately 50-acres in size and zoned one-acre residential sought a zoning amendment from the Town Board to allow for the construction of a multi-family condominium development. After being informed that the requested zoning change would not be made, the property owners commenced an action seeking a declaration that the Zoning Ordinance was unconstitutional, on the basis that multiple-family dwellings were not permitted in any zoning district. New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, set forth a two-part test to evaluate the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, with the first branch being whether the ordinance provided a properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community, and the second branch being whether the municipal board, in excluding new multiple housing, considered the needs of the region as well as the municipality for such housing. The Court then held, based upon the two-part test, that the subject Zoning Ordinance was unconstitutional. This case has been a landmark decision in New York State, and nationally, in determining a municipality’s constitutional obligation to provide an array of housing to meet both local and regional needs.
Matter of Riverkeeper v. Planning Board of Town of Southeast, 9 N.Y.3d 219, 851 N.Y.S.2d 76 (2007)
At issue before the Court of Appeals was the impact of environmental and regulatory change on a residential development that had been in the planning and review stages for nearly twenty years. The specific issue before the Court was whether the Planning Board, as lead agency pursuant to SEQRA, took the requisite hard look at the project and regulatory changes that arose after the filing of a SEQRA findings statement and made a reasoned elaboration that a second supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) was not necessary to address those changes. The Firm represented the Building and Realty Institute of Westchester and the Mid-Hudson region (BRI), which participated as amicus curiae and argued that the Appellate Division’s Order, which determined that the Planning Board could not have met its obligation under SEQRA without requiring a second SEIS to analyze the subject subdivision plat in light of the change of circumstances since 1991, hindered development of affordable housing, eroded property rights and imposed additional non-existent SEQRA requirements, in what amounted to proscribed judicial legislation.
The Court of Appeals held that the Planning Board had taken a hard look at the areas of environmental concerns and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its conclusion that a second SEIS was not necessary. The Court pointed to the fact that the Planning Board relied on material already in its files, including the DEIS, FEIS and SEIS, supplemental reports by the Town’s wetlands, environmental and planning consultants, in addition to the developer’s engineering consultant, and the Planning Board’s decision was supported by the evidence.
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